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Abstract 
We present lab-in-the-field experimental evidence of the effects of the Chinese one-child policy 
on individuals’ preferences and behavior as adults. The experiments were conducted in three 
different provinces because the policy was not strictly implemented at the same time in all 
provinces. We measure risk and time preferences, as well as subjects’ competitiveness, 
cooperation, and bargaining behavior, sampling individuals born both before and after the 
introduction of the policy. Overall, we do not find any sizeable or statistically significant effects 
of the one-child policy on preferences or behavior in any of the experiments. These results hold 
for heterogeneity in the timing of the implementation of the OCP in different provinces, for 
heterogeneity among individuals, and for various robustness checks.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The one-child policy (OCP) of China, introduced in 1979, is one of the most well-known family 
policies in modern times. China had many different family planning campaigns aimed at 
reducing high fertility rates before the OCP. In 1970, the fertility rate was 5.9 per woman, and 
in 1979, it was 2.7 (Hesketh and Zhu, 1997). The OCP could thus be seen as the last step in a 
long-term attempt to stop the increasing population growth, as a fertility rate of 2.1 is needed 
for a stable population size if there is no migration and the mortality rate is unchanged (OECD, 
2018). Since 1991, the fertility rate has been below 2.1 or even substantially lower, at times as 
low as 1.6 (World Bank, 2018). The long-run effects of the OCP have been dramatic, and today 
25% of all families in China have only one child, meaning that there are more than 100 million 
only children (Peng, 2011). Moreover, the OCP has had significant effects on increased sex-
ratio imbalance (Bulte et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011). Today China has the world’s largest sex-
ratio imbalance, with around 1.2 males per female, due to an extremely high sex-ratio difference 
at birth together with excess female child mortality (Li, 2007).1 In 2016, China changed the 
OCP to a two-child policy. The main reason for this policy change was a demographic 
imbalance, with an aging population and a lower proportion of the population at working ages. 
 
One critical aspect of the OCP compared with other family planning campaigns in China is that 
the reduction was from having to not having siblings rather than reducing the number of 
siblings. The general wisdom and stereotype is that only children, in particular,  are “little 
emperors”, since they get undivided attention from their parents and grandparents, while at the 
same time facing strong expectations to excel in life. Apart from direct demographic effects on 
population size and gender composition, it is thus possible that the OCP has resulted in 
behavioral and social consequences for those who were born under the policy, both because of 
the policy per se and also because of the changed social environment with larger shares of one-
child households and increased sex-ratio imbalance. The objective of this paper is therefore to 
investigate preferences and behavior among adults in China who were born just before and after 
the introduction in 1979 of the OCP, using economic experiments.  
 
 
                                                        
1 The sex ratio at birth was around 1.05 males/females in China until 1982, which is comparable to estimates of 
the natural sex ratio of 1.06 males/females (Grech et al., 2002). The ratio then increased and peaked at around 1.20 
males/females at birth in 2005 (Li, 2007). The ratio has started to decline since then and was 1.18 in 2011 (UNFPA, 
2012). 
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There is a vast literature, mostly in sociology and psychology, on the differences between 
children brought up with and without siblings. The empirical findings on the effects are mixed. 
Chen and Goldsmith (1991) review a large number of studies on only children and their 
behavior and conclude that the findings are inconsistent and inconclusive: around half of the 
studies showed that only children have poorer social skills than children with siblings, whereas 
a few found the converse, and the remaining found no overall differences. In a meta-analysis 
summarizing 115 studies on only children in China and the United States, Falbo (1987) reports 
no support for the negative stereotypes of being an only child. However, the opposite was found 
for many outcomes and characteristics. Several studies in economics have found that only 
children are more selfish, competitive, and status-driven and less empathetic (Lampi and 
Nordblom, 2010). The choice to have only one child when it is possible to have more children 
is a potential selection issue that can affect observed behavior in the aforementioned studies. 
This is a reason to use family planning campaigns as exogenous instruments to limit the number 
of children in a family. 
 
The empirical findings have also been inconclusive in the context of China. Studies focusing 
on China have found that only children are more self-centered (Peng, 2011) and that girls who 
are only children are more likely to experience depression (Tseng et al., 1988). On the other 
hand, Yang et al. (1995) find that only children in China are actually better off, having lower 
levels of fear, anxiety, and depression than children and adolescents with siblings. They have 
also had better achievements in school (Falbo 1987; Falbo and Poston, 1993). Although having 
only one child may increase human capital investments in that child (Becker, 1991), studies in 
economics have found no or at most a modest positive impact of being an only child, as a result 
of the OCP, on children’s education (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009; Liu, 2014). Furthermore, 
Shen and Yuan (1999) find no evidence that only children in China are more “spoiled” than 
children with siblings. Falbo and Poston (1993) study academic, personality, and physical 
outcomes of Chinese schoolchildren from four Chinese provinces and conclude that the OCP 
has not created a generation of “little emperors”. Peng (2011) argues that the differences 
between Chinese only children and those with siblings might not be as great as previously 
thought and that there is a lack of research on the societal impacts of the extent of only children.  
 
An interesting study that investigates the impacts on adults of the OCP is Cameron et al. (2013); 
this is also one of the few studies in economics investigating the impacts of the OCP on people’s 
preferences and behavior. They conducted four economic experiments (dictator, trust, risk, and 
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competition experiments) with individuals who were born before and after 1979,2 the year the 
OCP was introduced. They also used a survey to elicit personality traits. They find that 
compared with people born before the OCP was introduced, people born after the introduction 
of the policy had lower levels of trust and were less trustworthy, more risk-averse, less 
competitive, and more pessimistic, though not less altruistic. Thus their results mainly confirm 
the common view about the negative impacts of the OCP on preferences and behavior. 
Moreover, they find that these impacts are long-lasting, since the subjects were in their 30s at 
the time of the experiment.  
 
Given the large scale of effects of the OCP on the Chinese economy, together with mixed 
empirical findings on the behavioral effects of being an only child, the objective of our paper 
is to investigate the impacts of the OCP on preferences and behavior of adults who were born 
at the onset of the policy. We focus on risk and time preferences and several behavioral 
measures: cooperativeness, competitiveness, and bargaining behavior. We sample individuals 
born before and during the OCP. Having only one child before 1979 could have been a couple’s 
conscious choice, making it impossible to distinguish the effects of being an only child from 
the effects of different family background characteristics. Since the Chinese government 
implemented the OCP exogenously, it allows us to compare individuals born before and after 
the year 1979 and thereby separate the effects of the policy from unknown family effects. One 
feature of the OCP was that it was strictly enforced only on members of the Han majority who 
were employed residents in urban areas. Thus, we took a great care when creating our sample 
frame based on these three criteria to allow a clean test of the effects of the OCP on preferences 
and behavior. Importantly, the policy was less stringent when it was introduced in 1979, but it 
became more stringent in terms of enforcement and punishment. The timing of the introduction 
of the more stringent OCP differed across the country and typically started a couple of years 
later. We therefore conducted our study in three cities—Guilin, Wuxi, and Lanzhou—which 
are all in different provinces. These cities differ with respect to size, location, and the timing of 
when the policy became stricter. We will use the factor of timing to identify the effects of the 
policy on behavior and preferences.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the family planning policies in 
China. A description of our experimental design appears in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
                                                        
2 They mainly include subjects born before 1979 (1975 and 1978) and after 1979 (1980 and 1983). 
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descriptive statistics, and the results are given in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 discusses our 
results and concludes the paper.  
 
2. Family planning policies in China  
 
2.1. The national policies 
In the middle of the 1950s, Chinese authorities already had initiated a family planning campaign 
with the goal of reducing the population size. A second campaign was started in the 1960s, but 
this was suspended with the Cultural Revolution. A third was launched at the beginning of 
1970s, known as the “later, longer, and fewer” campaign, which encouraged people to get 
married later in life, have fewer children, and have larger age gaps between the children (Peng, 
2011). The third campaign resulted in a sharp reduction in fertility rates, from 5.9 children per 
women in 1970 to 2.7 in 1979 (Hesketh and Zhu, 1997). 
 
In October 1978, the central government explicitly advocated the policy “one is best, two at 
most” and that the gap between two children should be at least three years. In June 1979, the 
compulsory family planning campaign was launched at the second meeting of the fifth People’s 
Congress, and we define this as the first stage of the OCP. The OCP included several types of 
penalties for having more than one child, but the penalties and when they were implemented 
varied among provinces and cities. Examples of penalties included different kinds of 
restrictions to health care and schooling for the second child and monetary punishments for 
parents in the form of withdrawn bonuses at work or no wage increases. For government 
employees and Communist Party members, additional political and disciplinary punishments 
were implemented, such as not being able to advance politically, and government employees 
could lose their positions. Conversely, families with only one child received economic support.  
 
Although the OCP was specified as a national policy for the whole country, there were 
variations and flexibility in policy enforcements in response to local sociodemographic and 
economic conditions (Li et al., 2011; Zhang, 2017). In fact, the OCP was strictly enforced only 
on members of the Han majority who were employed residents in urban areas. In rural areas, 
people were allowed to have a second child if the first child was a girl and the age gap between 
the two children was at least four years. Furthermore, there were even fewer or no restrictions 
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on families from ethnic minorities. The “family planning” was stipulated as the basic national 
policy at the twelfth meeting of Chinese Communist Party in 1982.  
 
The OCP was one of several major policy reforms in China during the last decades of the 20th 
century, which also included economic reform in 1978 and educational reform in the late 1990s. 
The initiation of the OCP coincided with China’s economic reform in 1978, which was 
important for the country’s rapid economic development. However, subjects in our sample were 
at most two years old in 1978, and thus for those born between 1976 and 1986, it is not likely 
that there are differential impacts of the economic reform across age groups.3 In 1997, in 
response to the economic downturn and unemployment due to the Asian financial crisis, 
China’s central government proposed higher education reform through expanding college 
admissions. This higher education expansion policy was implemented in 1999 (Che and Zhang, 
2018), and we discuss this further in Section 5.5.2.4 
 
2.2. Implementation of the OCP in the three sampled cities 
We conducted our study in three cities: Guilin, in Guangxi province (southern China); Wuxi, 
in Jiangsu province (eastern China); and Lanzhou, in Gansu province (western China). Figure 
1 shows the locations of these cities. 
  
Figure 1. The locations of the three sampled cities 
                                                        
3 There is, for example, evidence that experience of a recession when growing up affect individual support for 
government redistribution and political preferences (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014). 
4 Although the central government’s education policy had increased the number of college students from 0.4 
million to 1.08 million between 1978 and 1998, the expansion in 1999 resulted in an increase of newly admitted 
students by around 40% (Li et al., 2014; Che and Zhang, 2018). 
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Table 1 summarizes the basic characteristics of the three cities. All three cities are large, but 
Wuxi is more developed than the other two, which explains the higher gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita. Differences in the mean disposable annual income per capita and in the 
average annual salary of employees are smaller across the cities.  
 
Table 1. Characteristics of three sampled cities 
Variable  Guilin Wuxi Lanzhou 
City area (km2)a  565 1643 1574 
City resident 
populationb 
 
1,507,200 3,613,800 2,659,700 
GDP per capita 
(yuan) 
 
34,859 126,389 54,771 
Disposable annual 
income per capita 
(yuan) 
 
26,811 41,731 23,030 
Average annual 
salary (yuan) 
 
45,194 68,187 51,928 
Source: The data come from 2015 statistics yearbooks at both city and provincial levels.  
a The total area of the city’s main districts. 
b Permanent residents who live in the city’s main districts. 
 
Although the three sampled cities implemented the national family planning policy around the 
same time in 1979, the timing of the implementation of the stricter OCP varied because of the 
different local administrative processes. Based on information from city family planning policy 
archives and chorography, we next summarize the implementation of the OCP in each of the 
three selected cities. 
 
2.2.1. Guilin 
On 20 September 1979, the Guilin municipal government issued the 118th document, titled The 
Provisional Regulations on Family Planning. This document stipulated the basic requirement 
of “one is best, two at most”, with an age gap of at least three years between the first child and 
the second. The OCP became stricter with the 69th document, issued on 18 May 1981. Titled 
Supplementary Regulations on Family Planning and Control Population Increase”, it clearly 
specified that each couple could have only one child. For families with more than one child, the 
salary of the parents would have 10% per month deducted until the second child was 7 years 
old, and the amount deducted would increase for each additional child. By contrast, couples 
who had only one child would be rewarded with childcare, medical services, parental leave, 
and pensions.  
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2.2.2. Wuxi 
On 31 July 1979, the Wuxi government introduced the “one is best, two at most” policy. From 
1 May 1980, couples who had three or more children (not including the second birth with twins) 
had to pay fines. From June 1982, Wuxi followed the provincial policy that government 
officials, employees, and citizens could have only one child. For families with more than one 
child, 10% of the parents’ salary would be deducted for 7 years for the second child and 20% 
for 10 years for the third child. In addition, other welfare benefits would be suspended for 
couples with more than one child including the medical services, salary during parental leave, 
and possibilities to be promoted.  
 
2.2.3. Lanzhou 
On 14 July 1979, Lanzhou followed the provincial family planning policy, “one is best, two at 
most”. Couples who had three or more children had to pay extra child fees. On 20 April 1982, 
the Lanzhou government issued supplementary announcements about implementing a 
provincial document titled The Regulations on the Specific Policies of Family Planning. Urban 
citizens could have only one child. If a family had a second child without being exempted, the 
mother’s salary would be suspended, and both the father’s and mother’s salaries would be 
reduced by 10% until the child reached the age of 10. The fines would increase with the number 
of additional children a family had. 
 
3. Experimental design and procedure 
 
3.1. Experimental design 
We conducted five economic experiments. The first two concerned uncertainty (risk and 
ambiguity) and time preferences, while the three other concerned behavior in a setting with 
strategic interaction: competitiveness in a tournament experiment, cooperation in a public good 
experiment, and bargaining in an ultimatum bargaining experiment. All experiments followed 
standard designs, but since they were implemented in the field, some modifications were made. 
The five experiments are described in detail in Appendix A. Here we just briefly present them. 
 
In the uncertainty experiments, we elicited preferences for lotteries with probabilities of 
winning of 10%, 50%, and 90%. We used a choice list where subjects chose between a safe 
amount and a lottery with a certain probability of winning a fixed amount (e.g., Sutter et al., 
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2013). For each new row on the choice list, the safe amount was increased. We measure risk 
attitudes based on the choice when a subject switched from choosing the lottery to choosing the 
safe amount. The experiment with ambiguity was similar, but the distribution was unknown. 
For example, with a 10% winning probability, the subjects were told that in a large bag, there 
were many balls numbered from 1 to 10 but that the distribution of the numbered balls was 
unknown. They were then asked to bet on one number.  
 
In the time preference experiment, subjects were asked to make repeated choices between a 
sooner payment that was fixed and a later payment that would increase. We were interested in 
the switching point from sooner to later payment in four different tasks where the subjects had 
to make decisions between (i) today and one week, (ii) one week and two weeks, (iii) today and 
two weeks, and (iv) two weeks and four weeks. 
 
The experiment on competitiveness followed the design of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). 
Subjects completed three tasks, but only one would be randomly selected as payoff relevant. 
Each subject was randomly matched with three other participants to form a group, but they did 
not know who the other group members were. The group composition was the same during the 
whole competition experiment, and in each group, two were men and two were women. In the 
experiment, subjects faced the task of calculating the sum of five randomly chosen two-digit 
numbers. There were three tasks. Task 1 was piece rate, and subjects were paid 3 yuan per 
problem solved if the task was randomly selected for payment. Task 2 was a tournament in 
which subjects had three minutes to solve the same type of math problems. The group member 
who solved the largest number of problems received 12 yuan per correct solution, while the 
other participants received no payment. For Task 3, subjects first had to choose the payment 
schedule, piece rate or tournament, and then again solve the same type of math problems.  
 
The one-shot public good experiment used a strategy design similar to that of Fischbacher et al. 
(2001). Subjects made two contribution decisions: unconditional and conditional. Each unit 
invested in the public good generated an income of 0.4 for each of the four group members. In 
the unconditional decision, subjects decided how many tokens to invest in a public good. In the 
conditional decision, subjects decided how much to contribute to a public account conditional 
on a specific average contribution of the other group members.  
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In the ultimatum bargaining experiment, subjects were randomly matched in pairs as player 1 
and player 2. Subjects did not know their roles beforehand, so they had to make decisions as 
both player 1 and player 2. The experiment worked as follows: Player 1 decided how to allocate 
an endowment of 40 yuan between the two subjects, and player 2 decided whether to accept or 
refuse the allocation. If player 2 accepted player 1’s allocation, then player 1 and player 2 split 
the money according to player 1’s allocation. If player 2 refused player 1’s allocation, then 
neither player received anything.  
 
3.2. Experimental procedure 
We conducted the experiments in Guilin in June 2014, in Wuxi in November 2014, and in 
Lanzhou in December 2014. To identify and analyze the direct effects of the OCP, we aimed at 
a sampling frame that included only people who were born in 1976–86 in the sampled city, 
whose parents had an urban hukou at the time of their birth, and who belonged to the Han 
majority.5 When defining the frame, we needed to consider available register data as well as 
what was practical and logistically feasible. Thus, the selection of subjects was done in several 
steps. First, we used the community registration system, which contains lists of all households 
in the city. The list includes people not eligible for our study, and hence we needed to remove 
them before making a random selection of participants. Since the cities are large (1.5–3.6 
million inhabitants), it was not practical to go through all households in the register to create a 
sampling frame from which we would randomly select subjects. Instead, we drew a random 
sample from the register and then checked whether households were eligible according to our 
above three selection criteria. It should be noted that we stratified on gender to ensure gender 
balance in our study. The community coordinators helped us make an initial assessment based 
on our selection criteria.6 After potential subjects were selected by the community coordinators, 
we contacted them by phone to make sure that they met the criteria for our study.7 Eligible 
subjects were invited to participate in our study. Subjects were told that they would receive a 
show-up fee of 50 yuan and that they could earn more money during the study.8 
 
                                                        
5 Hukou refers to the Chinese household registration system. Since the policy was strictly applied to people with 
a city hukou, we had to make sure both parents had a city hukou. 
6 The community coordinators work with the community, so they are more familiar to the residents. They helped 
us introduce our survey to the eligible subjects and thus increased their trust in our study 
7 In the phone call, we introduced ourselves as researchers from Beijing University, referred to the contact they 
had with the community coordinator who had identified them as eligible, and asked three questions to confirm that 
they met our eligibility criteria.  
8 At the time of the experiment, 10 yuan  = 1.6 USD. 
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When subjects arrived at the place where the study was conducted, we checked their identity to 
make sure that they had been invited and that the three criteria for participating in the study 
were fulfilled. If not, the subjects were not allowed to participate. The experimenter then 
introduced the study and explained key rules, such as that the show-up fee would be paid only 
if they completed the experiments and the questionnaire. Everything was done in one-on-one 
interviews, including the experiments that we will now describe.  
 
The study was organized as follows: we first conducted the five experiments, then had subjects 
answer the questionnaire, and finally paid the subjects. The experiments were always conducted 
in the same order, since we wanted to reduce the risk of problems with implementation and 
because there are 120 different ways the five experiments could be ordered. No information 
about the outcome or any other type of feedback was given between experiments. After the 
experiments, the subjects answered questionnaires about their socioeconomic characteristics. 
The experiments and questionnaire took about 1.5 hours. Finally, the subjects were paid the 50 
yuan show-up fee, as well as any earnings from the uncertainty and time preference experiments 
(if the subject had chosen payment today). Payment for the time preference experiment if a 
subject had chosen payment later was made via transfer to the subject’s bank account on the 
specific date. For the three other experiments, tournament, public good, and ultimatum game, 
subjects were invited to come back at a specific date for payment, since payments depended on 
the decisions of others as well. For specific details on how the payoff decision was made in 
each experiment, see Appendix A. 
 
4. Description of sample 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
A total of 856 subjects participated in the experiments. In the postexperiment survey, we 
discovered that 72 subjects in the city of Guilin were not born as citizens of Guilin.9 We also 
noticed that one subject in Guilin and one in Lanzhou had an invalid birth year. We dropped 
these 74 subjects, since it is essential for the research design to know in which city they were 
born. This leaves us with 782 subjects: 335 in Guilin, 200 in Wuxi, and 247 in Lanzhou. Table 
2 presents descriptive statistics of the whole sample and for the three cities separately.  
 
  
                                                        
9 The 72 subjects were actually born in what was now part of Guilin city, but it was not part of the city at the time 
when they were born. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Whole 
sample 
Guilin Wuxi Lanzhou H0: No 
difference 
between cities 
(p-value)  
Female = 1 if female subject 0.49 
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.96 
Have children = 1 if subject has at 
least one child 
0.65 
(0.48) 
0.55 
(0.50) 
0.81 
(0.39) 
0.65 
(0.48) 
<0.01 
Number 
children 
No. of children if 
subject has children 
1.04 
(0.19) 
1.04 
(0.20) 
1.02 
(0.16) 
1.04 
(0.19) 
0.64 
Married  = 1 if married 0.78 
(0.42) 
0.70 
(0.46) 
0.89 
(0.32) 
0.76 
(0.42) 
<0.01 
Only child = 1 if no siblings 0.73 
(0.44) 
0.71 
(0.45) 
0.82 
(0.39) 
0.70 
(0.46) 
0.01 
Number 
siblings 
No. of siblings if 
subject has siblings 
1.25 
(0.44) 
1.14 
(0.41) 
1.32 
(0.48) 
1.34 
(0.71) 
0.03 
Income Own annual income in 
10,000 yuan 
4.83 
(5.42) 
3.77 
(4.27) 
6.51 
(4.40) 
4.89 
(7.00) 
<0.01 
Household 
income 
Annual household 
income in 10,000 yuan 
13.0 
(10.7) 
10.38 
(7.99) 
18.52 
(11.09) 
12.05 
(11.82) 
<0.01 
University = 1 if university 
education 
0.51 
(0.38) 
0.42 
(0.41) 
0.58 
(0.35) 
0.58 
(0.36) 
0.07 
Number of individuals 782 335 200 247  
Note: We use chi-square test for binary variables and Kruskal-Wallis test for continuous data. Standard deviations 
in parentheses. 
 
Women make up half of the sample, since this was a sampling criterion, and a large proportion 
are married. Of the 782 subjects, 73% are only children, and among those that have siblings, 
the average number of siblings is 1.25. Out of the 65% that have children, an overwhelming 
majority have only one child. The average yearly income is 48,300 yuan, and 51% have a 
university education.10 If we compare the statistics across the three cities, we observe some 
differences. In Wuxi, both individual and household incomes are considerably higher, and a 
larger proportion of subjects grew up as only children, are now married, and have children. The 
number of siblings is considerably higher in Lanzhou. 
 
4.2. Distribution of birth years and the implementation of the OCP 
Table 3 reports the distribution of subjects across birth years for the whole sample and for each 
of the three cities separately. 
 
  
                                                        
10 Using Chinese sixth census data for 2010, we calculate the share of people with a university education for the 
total population in the main districts we surveyed, and the share is 20% in Guilin, 28% in Wuxi, and 16% in 
Lanzhou. The census data include people who are 6 years and older, as well as elderly people who were not affected 
by the significant university expansion in 1999, whereas our sample includes people born between 1976 and 1986. 
Given the expansion in university education from 1999 in China, the shares we observe in our sample are not in 
any way extreme. 
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Table 3. Distribution of subjects across birth years 
Birth year Whole sample Guilin Wuxi Lanzhou 
1976 9.6% 8.4% 13.0% 8.5% 
1977 9.3% 9.3% 10.5% 8.5% 
1978 11.0% 11.3% 10.5% 10.9% 
1979 7.4% 9.0% 6.5% 6.1% 
1980 5.9% 6.0% 7.0% 4.9% 
1981 8.1% 7.2% 8.5% 8.9% 
1982 10.4% 10.5% 9.0% 11.3% 
1983 10.5% 9.9% 9.5% 12.2% 
1984 10.1% 9.9% 9.0% 11.3% 
1985 8.1% 8.4% 8.0% 7.7% 
1986 9.7% 10.5% 8.5% 9.7% 
Number of 
individuals 
782 335 200 247 
 
As described in Section 2, before the introduction of the OCP in 1979, several family planning 
campaigns had been launched that aimed to reduce the number of children. According to Zhang 
(2017), the decrease in fertility was significantly smaller after the introduction of the OCP than 
during the early 1970s: the total fertility rate declined from 5.8 in 1970 to 2.7 in 1978, and the 
corresponding decline from 1978 to 1995 was from 2.8 to 1.8 children per woman. At the time 
the policy was introduced, fertility rates were dropping in urban areas in all three provinces we 
study, and the drop in fertility rates was even larger in our three study provinces than in Beijing 
(per our own calculations based on Coale and Li, 1987).  
 
Note that in the early days of the OCP, instead of forbidding couples to have more than one 
child, it was strongly recommended that they have only one child. Therefore, we define the start 
of the “one is best, two at most” recommendation as the first stage of the OCP in this study. 
People born in July to September 1979 and onward, but before the policy became stricter, are 
classified as belonging to the first stage of the OCP. Clearly, we could think of other cutoff 
dates, and we investigate other cutoffs in a sensitivity analysis (Tables C1–C4 in Appendix C). 
We define the second stage, with a stricter implementation of the OCP, as when a financial 
penalty in terms of a salary cut was imposed on couples with more than one child. The policy 
was made stricter at varying times in the three cities: In Guilin, subjects born from May 1981 
and onward are defined as born under a stricter OCP. In Wuxi and Lanzhou, the corresponding 
cutoffs are June 1982 and April 1982, respectively. The resulting distribution of subjects and 
the cutoff dates for the first and second stages of the OCP are presented in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Distribution of subjects based on implementation of the OCP in the three locations 
 Whole sample Guilin Wuxi Lanzhou 
Before OCP 34.1% 34.0% 37.0% 32.0% 
First stage OCP 16.5% 11.3% 23.0% 18.2% 
Second stage OCP 49.4% 54.6% 40.0% 49.8% 
Cutoff dates 
First stage OCP  20 Sept. 1979 31 July 1979 14 July 1979 
Second stage OCP  18 May 1981 1 June 1982 20 April 1982 
 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the subjects, separated by the different stages of the 
OCP. The differences among the three groups are as expected. A larger share of those born 
before the OCP have siblings. Furthermore, more of them also have children themselves and 
are married, which is as expected, since these subjects are older. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for subjects born before the OCP, during the first stage, and 
during the second stage 
 Before OCP First stage OCP Second stage OCP H0: No difference 
between the different 
stages of the OCP 
Female 0.51 
(0.51) 
0.55 
(0.50) 
0.46 
(0.50) 
0.16 
Have children 0.84 
(0.36) 
0.73 
(0.45) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
<0.01 
Number of children 1.04 
(0.21) 
1.03 
(0.18) 
1.03 
(0.16) 
0.61 
Married  0.91 
(0.29) 
0.82 
(0.40) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
<0.01 
Only child 0.47 
(0.50) 
0.81 
(0.39) 
0.89 
(0.31) 
<0.01 
Number of siblings (if 
any) 
1.31 
(0.60) 
1.17 
(0.48) 
1.07 
(0.34) 
0.01 
Income 4.88 
(5.57) 
5.20 
(4.22) 
4.66 
(5.67) 
0.24 
Household income 12.49 
(10.50) 
14.05 
(9.90) 
12.98 
(11.02) 
0.08 
University 0.38 
(0.49) 
0.54 
(0.50) 
0.60 
(0.49) 
<0.01 
Number of individuals 267 129 386  
Note: We use chi-square test for binary variables and Kruskal-Wallis test for continuous data. Standard deviations 
in parentheses. 
 
To establish that the OCP and the increased strictness of the policy did affect the household 
composition, we estimate models explaining the likelihood of being an only child (binary 
probit) and the number of siblings (ordinary least squares), respectively. As independent 
variables, we include two indicator variables for the two stages of the OCP and controls for age, 
location fixed effects, and gender. Note that the two indicator variables for the policies are not 
perfectly correlated with age, since we are using the variation in implementation dates among 
the three cities. Results of the binary probit model and the OLS model are presented in Table 
6. 
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Table 6. Regression models, the OCP and the likelihood of being an only child and the 
number of siblings, marginal effects for probit model 
 Only child 
(probit) 
No. of siblings 
(OLS) 
First stage OCP 0.171*** 
(0.039) 
-0.338*** 
(0.076) 
Second stage OCP 0.231*** 
(0.087) 
-0.292*** 
(0.112) 
Age Yes Yes 
Location  
Gender 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Number of individuals 782 782 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
The results show that the likelihood of being an only child is considerably higher for the subjects 
born during the first or second stage of the OCP. Similarly, the number of siblings is 
significantly lower for those born during the OCP than for those born before the policy. There 
are no differences between the two stages for being only child or number of siblings.  
 
5. Results 
We first investigate the effects of the two stages of the OCP on uncertainty and time 
preferences, as well as on behavior related to cooperation, competition, and bargaining. Then 
we explore whether the effects of the OCP depend on gender, differences among the cities, or 
other observable socioeconomic characteristics. Finally, we investigate whether our findings 
are robust to alternative cutoff times for the stages of the OCP, considering only firstborns, and 
the major university reform in 1999.  
 
5.1. Risk and ambiguity preferences 
Results from risk (with known probabilities) and ambiguity (with unknown probabilities) are 
shown in the upper panel of Table 7. To make attitudes comparable for different probabilities, 
we calculate the ratio between the certainty equivalent at the switching point and the expected 
value for each of the six lotteries, resulting in a standardized ratio. A ratio between the certainty 
equivalent and the expected value greater than one indicates that the subject is risk loving, while 
a ratio smaller than one indicates that the subject is risk averse. We report the results separately 
for before the OCP and the first and second stages of the OCP.  
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Table 7. Ratio between certainty equivalence and expected value in risk and ambiguity 
experiments  
 Risk experiment Ambiguity experiment 
 10% 50%  90% 10% 50% 90% 
Before OCP  2.41 
(1.70) 
0.90 
(0.30) 
0.78 
(0.16) 
1.90 
(1.60) 
0.65 
(0.34) 
0.64 
(0.22) 
First stage OCP  2.78 
(2.01) 
0.99 
(0.33) 
0.81 
(0.13) 
2.23 
(1.83) 
0.75 
(0.34) 
0.68 
(0.21) 
Second stage OCP 2.49 
(1.82) 
0.98 
(0.34) 
0.80 
(0.13) 
2.29 
(1.96) 
0.73 
(0.37) 
0.66 
(0.21) 
Number of 
observations 
2346 2346 2346 2346 2346 2346 
Number of 
individuals 
782 782 782 782 782 782 
H0: No difference between  
OCP stages                                                                                 P-values 
Before vs First  0.094 0.007 0.027 0.039 0.008 0.196 
Before vs Second  0.606 0.005 0.145 0.017 0.018 0.264 
First vs Second 0.149 0.601 0.222 0.820 0.350 0.610 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Results show that subjects are risk loving for small probabilities and risk averse for large 
winning probabilities, while slightly risk averse when the probability of winning is 50%. If we 
compare ratios between the risk and ambiguity experiments, we find higher tolerance for risky 
outcomes than for ambiguous outcomes for a given probability—that is, subjects are on average 
ambiguity averse. These results are in line with previous findings (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; l'Haridon et al., 2018).  
 
In the lower panel of Table 7, we show the pairwise statistical tests (Kruskal-Wallis) between 
the ratios for different OCP stages. We find small differences in risk and ambiguity attitudes 
among the different stages. Overall, individuals who were born before the introduction of the 
OCP are less risk and ambiguity seeking than those born after the introduction of the OCP. In 
terms of economic significance, however, the differences are small. 
 
We use the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) correction to consider the fact that we make 
multiple comparisons, which Benjamini and Yekuteli (2001) recommend for most empirical 
settings.11 We first order the observed p-values from the smallest to the largest. Then we 
sequentially test whether the following condition holds: 𝑝(𝑖) ≤
𝑖
𝑚 
 𝛼, where p(i) is the actual p-
value to be tested, i is the order of that specific p-value (i.e., i for the smallest p-value is 1), m 
                                                        
11 A stricter method is the Bonferroni correction (Dunn, 1961). For example, testing 18 comparisons, as in Table 
7, would mean that for a difference to be statistically significant at the 10% level, each of the observed p-values 
must be lower than 0.0056 after the correction. However, Duflo et al. (2008) argue that Bonferroni corrections 
may not be that suitable for economic field experiments, since the control of Type I errors (false positives) comes 
at the cost of high Type II errors (less power). We therefore use the Benjamini-Hochberg correction instead.  
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is the total number of comparisons made, and α is the chosen significance level. In total, we 
make 18 comparisons, 9 for each experiment. After the Benjamini and Hochberg correction, 6 
out of the 18 possible comparisons remain statistically significant at the 10% level.12  
 
In Table 8, we present results from regression models controlling for location fixed effects and 
the age of the subjects. The regression results support the descriptive results that subjects are 
on average risk or ambiguity loving for low probabilities and averse for medium and high 
probabilities. Furthermore, the results of the statistical tests in the lower panel of Table 8 show 
that after the introduction of the controls, there are now only three statistically significant 
differences among the different stages of the OCP with respect to risk and ambiguity 
preferences at the 10% level. In summary, we find some evidence that those born during the 
first and second stages of the OCP are different from those born before the OCP. However, the 
fact that the policy became stricter later on (the second stage of the OCP) does not result in an 
additional change in risk preferences compared with the first stage of the OCP. 
 
  
                                                        
12 All p-values less than 0.039 are considered as statistically significant after the correction. 
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Table 8. Regression model of risk and ambiguity preferences 
 Risk Ambiguity 
Probability 10% 2.39*** 
(0.11) 
1.85*** 
(0.11) 
Probability 50% 0.88*** 
(0.05) 
0.61*** 
(0.06) 
Probability 90% 0.76*** 
(0.05) 
0.60*** 
(0.06) 
Probability 10% × First stage OCP 0.38* 
(0.21) 
0.35* 
(0.20) 
Probability 50% × First stage OCP 0.10 
(0.07) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
Probability 90% × First stage OCP 0.03 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
Probability 10% × Second stage OCP 0.13 
(0.20) 
0.49** 
(0.20) 
Probability 50% × Second stage OCP 0.12 
(0.13) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
Probability 90% × Second stage OCP 0.06 
(0.13) 
0.11 
(0.14) 
Age Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2346 2346 
Number of individuals 782 782 
H0: No difference between OCP stages P-values 
Probability 10%   
Before vs First  0.07 0.08 
Before vs Second  0.51 0.02 
First vs Second 0.25 0.51 
Probability 50%   
Before vs First  0.13 0.13 
Before vs Second  0.36 0.26 
First vs Second 0.78 0.53 
Probability 90%   
Before vs First  0.58 0.48 
Before vs Second  0.63 0.43 
First vs Second 0.69 0.44 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
5.2. Time preferences 
The design of the time preference experiment allows us to estimate the beta-delta model by 
Laibson (1997). This is an exponential discounting model (𝛿) with a preference for immediately 
receiving a good or money (present bias), where any future event is given a lower value (𝛽). 
We estimate the following regression model, based on Burks et al. (2012), which assumes an 
additive error term: 
ln(𝑥) − ln(𝑦) = ln(𝛽) 𝑡0 + ln(𝛿) (𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 − 𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟) + 𝜀, 
where x is the sooner amount of payment, y is the later amount of payment, t0 is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the sooner payment is today, 𝛽 is the present bias parameter, 𝛿 is the 
discount parameter, and 𝜀 is the error term. In Table 9, we report the regression results.  
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Table 9. Regression model of time preferences 
 Coefficient  
log(𝛽) 0.001 
(0.004) 
 
log(𝛿) -0.009*** 
(0.0005) 
 
log(𝛽) × First stage OCP -0.005 
(0.005) 
 
log(𝛿) × First stage OCP 0.0003 
(0.001) 
 
log(𝛽) × Second stage OCP -0.007 
(0.007) 
 
log(𝛿) × Second stage OCP 0.002 
(0.001) 
 
Age Yes  
Location fixed effects Yes  
Number of observations 3128  
Number of individuals 782  
H0: 𝛽=1; H0: 𝛿=0 𝛽a 𝛿a 
Before OCP  0.998 
(0.010) 
0.976*** 
(0.001) 
First stage OCP  0.986** 
(0.007) 
0.977*** 
(0.001) 
Second stage OCP  0.982** 
(0.008) 
0.980*** 
(0.001) 
H0: No difference between OCP stages P-values 
Before vs First                0.257           0.595 
Before vs Second                0.331         0.132 
First vs Second               0.745         0.088 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
a Test if different from one. 
 
There is support for the presence of present bias, since the 𝛽 -parameter is statistically 
significantly different from one for the later stages of the OCP. However, there are no 
statistically significant differences between the of the OCP. At the same time, there is a 
statistically significant discount effect of future payments (𝛿), since for all stages the discount 
factor is statistically significantly different from one. There is a statistically significant 
difference at the 10% level in impatience (𝛿) between subjects born during the first and second 
stages of the OCP. The differences are, however, small. 
 
5.3. Cooperation, competition, and bargaining 
In Table 10, we report average values from three behavioral experiments—public good (PG), 
competition, and ultimatum game—separated by the different stages of the OCP.  
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics of main variables in the three behavioral experiments 
 PG Competition Ultimatum 
 Contribution 
(tokens) 
Performance 
increase 
Choose 
tournament 
Offer Min. acceptable 
offer 
Before OCP  8.06 
(4.39) 
0.64 
(2.38) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
19.8 
(2.06) 
14.9 
(5.63) 
First stage OCP  8.22 
(4.19) 
0.53 
(2.32) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
19.6 
(2.14) 
15.2 
(6.05) 
Second stage OCP  8.10 
(4.86) 
0.66 
(2.13) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
19.5 
(2.14) 
15.4 
(5.61) 
Number of individuals  782 782 782 782 782 
H0: No difference 
between OCP stages 
P-values 
Before vs First  0.415 0.661 0.108 0.934 0.238 
Before vs Second  0.712 0.931 0.353 0.059 0.107 
First vs Second 0.269 0.610 0.339 0.154 0.943 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
The average unconditional contribution to the public good is about the same across the three 
OCP stages, and Mann-Whitney tests show that there are no statistically significant differences 
across the three groups. The maximum contribution was 20 tokens, meaning that the average 
contribution share is around 40%, which is within the range of what is typically found in this 
type of experiment (see, e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kocher et al., 2008: 
Martinsson et al., 2015). By using the responses to the conditional contribution table, subjects 
can be classified into contributor types such as free riders and conditional cooperators 
(Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Using a chi-square test, we investigate whether the 
distribution of contributor types is the same in all three stages, and we cannot reject this 
hypothesis (p-value = 0.894). 
 
For the experiment on competitiveness, we focus on two measures. First, we look at the change 
in performance going from Task 1, piece rate, to Task 2, tournament. This is a measure of 
competitiveness at the intensive margin. Second, we look at the share of subjects choosing 
tournament when faced with a choice between piece rate and tournament. There is no clear 
pattern of differences in performance improvement among the three different stages of the OCP, 
and there are no statistically significant differences. The share of subjects choosing tournament 
is around 30%, and it is somewhat higher for those born after the OCP, but using proportion 
tests, there are no statistically significant differences among the three different stages. The share 
of subjects choosing tournament is considerably lower than what most other studies have found, 
including the original study by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) (see also overview in Niederle, 
2016).  
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In the ultimatum bargaining game, subjects played both roles, and we thus report both the 
amount offered and the minimum acceptable offer for all subjects. The amount offered is 
slightly below 50% of the endowment, and the average offer is about the same across the three 
groups. An offer of 50% is in line with previous experiments (see, e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 
2001; Thaler, 1988). The averages across the three stages are similar. Using a Mann-Whitney 
test, we find one statistically significant difference at the 10% level in the amount offered, 
which is between those born before the OCP and during the second stage of the OCP. The 
minimum acceptable offer is around 38% of the endowment, which is also largely in line with 
previous findings (Güth and Kocher, 2014). The minimum acceptable offer is again similar in 
all three stages of the OCP, and there are no statistically significant differences among the three 
stages using a Mann-Whitney test. 
 
The next step is to investigate differences in behavior across the three stages while controlling 
for the location and the age of the subject using a regression approach. The likelihood of 
choosing the tournament in the competition experiment is analyzed with a binary probit model, 
while all the other models are analyzed by using an OLS regression.13 Table 11 shows that once 
we control for age and location fixed effects, there are no statistically significant differences in 
the public good, competition, or ultimatum game across the three different stages. To sum up, 
regarding the behavioral experiments, there is no evidence of a difference in behavior between 
subjects born before and during the OCP. 
 
Table 11. Regression models of behavioral experiments 
 PG Competition Ultimatum 
 Contribution Performance 
increase 
Choose 
tournament 
Offer Min. acceptable 
offer 
First stage OCP  -0.353 
(0.635) 
0.006 
(0.311) 
0.069 
(0.067) 
0.121 
(0.291) 
0.364 
(0.782) 
Second stage OCP  -0.945 
(0.932) 
0.265 
(0.456) 
0.001 
(0.094) 
0.306 
(0.427) 
0.996 
(1.149) 
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
individuals 
782 782 782 782 782 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% 
level. 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
13 Results remain the same if we estimate a two-limit Tobit model. 
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5.4. Heterogeneous effects  
It is possible that the OCP affects different subgroups of our sample differently. The most 
obvious candidate is probably gender differences in preferences and behavior. Traditionally, 
women have been discriminated against in China (Hannum, 2005). A possible consequence of 
the OCP, with an increased and substantial sex-ratio difference after the introduction of the 
OCP, is that it might affect preferences and behavior among men and women differently. We 
also know from previous experiments that there might be differences in behavior between men 
and women; for example, some studies find that women are more risk averse than men (Croson 
and Gneezy, 2009), although this is far from a general finding (Filippin and Crosetto, 2016). 
We therefore conduct the same analyses as in Section 5.1 and 5.2, but separately for men and 
women. Results are reported in Tables B1–B3 in Appendix B. These analyses do not reveal any 
important differences between genders when it comes to preferences and behavior. Overall, 
there are only a small number of statistically significant differences across the stages of the 
OCP when we conduct the analyses separately for men and women.  
 
The three cities differ in many dimensions, including the specific rules of the OCP. We 
therefore estimate separate models for each city. Results are reported in Tables B4–B6 in 
Appendix B. Overall, we find only a few differences among subjects born in the different cities. 
In the behavioral experiments, we find one clear result: In Wuxi, those born after the OCP 
offered more in the ultimatum game than those born before the OCP.  
 
Finally, we also estimate all models in the main analysis but include the following variables: 
gender, whether they have children, whether they are married, household income, whether they 
have a university education, and whether any of their parents have a university education. 
Results are reported in Tables B7–B9 in Appendix B. We find that subjects with a university 
degree are more risk and ambiguity averse, are more impatient, and contribute less to the public 
good. There are no statistically significant differences in preferences due to parents’ education 
or household income, with one exception: Those with higher incomes are more likely to choose 
tournament in the competition experiment. For risk and ambiguity preferences, there are also 
some differences between subjects born before and after the OCP when controlling for the 
additional set of socioeconomic variables. Subjects born before the OCP are now less risk 
loving and ambiguity seeking at a probability of 50% of winning, both for risky and ambiguous 
prospects.  
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5.5. Robustness checks 
 
5.5.1. Using alternative cutoff dates and considering only firstborns 
Since a pregnancy takes nine months, firstborns born close to any of the dates when the local 
authorities implemented the OCP are more likely to be only children. The gap between the date 
of birth and implementation of the two stages of the OCP is simply too tight for these children 
to have siblings. As a robustness check, we change the cutoff dates to be one year earlier than 
the dates used in the main analysis. In Table 12, we show the distribution of the subjects 
according to our main and alternative cutoff dates.  
 
Table 12. Distribution of subjects based on implementation of the OCP with both cutoff dates 
in the three locations 
         Guilin              Wuxi Lanzhou 
Cutoff definitions Main      Alt.             Main          Alt.  Main            Alt. 
Cutoff between before 
OCP and second stage 
OCP 
20 Sept. 
1979 
20 Sept. 
1978 
31 July 
1979 
31 July 
1978 
14 July 
1979 
14 July 
1978 
Cutoff between first 
and second stages OCP 
18 May 
1980 
18 May 
1979 
1 June 
1982 
1 June 
1981 
20 April 
1982 
20 April 
1981 
Before OCP 34.0% 24.8% 37.0% 29.5% 32.0% 22.3% 
First stage OCP 11.3% 15.5% 23.0% 21.0% 18.2% 17.8% 
Second stage OCP 54.6% 59.7% 40.0% 49.5% 49.8% 59.9% 
 
We reestimate the main models, and the results are shown in Tables C1–C4 in Appendix C. 
With the new classification, the likelihood of being an only child is 19 percentage points higher 
if a child was born during the first stage of the OCP policy, and it is almost as high as 30 
percentage points if he or she was born during the second stage of the policy (Table C1). 
Overall, there are no significant differences compared with the main analysis, with a few 
exceptions: The effects of being born before the OCP on being less risk and ambiguity seeking 
are less prominent, and the results are now insignificant in most cases (Table C2). Subjects born 
after the second stage of the OCP are more patient and more likely to choose tournament than 
those born before OCP.  
 
We also investigate the effects of the policy by considering only firstborns; firstborns before 
the policy would have been the only children if born after the OCP was implemented. The 
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results are presented in Tables D1–D3 in Appendix D. Results are very similar to the ones in 
the main analysis.14  
 
5.5.2. Investigating the effects of the 1999 university reform 
Finally, we investigate the effects of the large university reform in 1999. People in China 
typically enroll into a university at 18 years old (Che and Zhang, 2018). Hence, subjects born 
after 1980 have benefitted from this reform. We conduct three analyses to investigate potential 
effects of this education reform on preferences and behavior. First, we use an indicator to 
identify post university-reform time in the regressions (Tables E1–E3 in Appendix E). The 
dummy variable for the university reform is sometimes statistically significant, but there are no 
sizeable differences compared with the main analysis. Second, we control for university 
education and estimate separate models for those with and without a university education 
(Tables E4–E6 in Appendix E). Third, using subjects born before the education reform, we 
estimate a model predicting the likelihood of getting a university education. This model is then 
used to predict university education for the sample born after the education reform. We then 
perform the same analyses as in the main section based on these two subsamples instead (Tables 
E7–E9 in Appendix E).  
 
Overall, there are no large differences compared with the main analysis. The main difference is 
that we find a statistically significant difference only in risk and ambiguity preferences between 
those born before and during the OCP for those with a university education (see Tables E4 and 
E7 in Appendix E). Thus, the university reform might have had an impact on the distribution of 
risk and ambiguity preferences among the sample, but not on behavior in the domains we have 
investigated. 
 
6. Discussion 
The best-known family policy of all times, China’s one-child policy (OCP), was implemented 
in 1979. The OCP led to an increased number of one-child families and an increased gender 
imbalance. An important question is whether the policy had an effect on people’s preferences 
and behavior. Popular wisdom seems to be that it is in many ways negative, especially for 
different kinds of social skills, to be an only child. On the other hand, the overall conclusion 
from the literature indicates that the effects of being an only child on preferences and behavior 
                                                        
14 The statistically significant difference in patience between the first and second stages of the OCP in Table 9 is 
insignificant in Table D2. 
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are not all evident. Moreover, there is a lack of studies investigating the effects of the OCP on 
preferences and behavior among adults. We have therefore conducted a lab-in-the-field 
experiment where we sampled subjects born before and after the implementation of the policy. 
We also used the fact that the OCP was introduced in two stages. The first stage was introduced 
in 1979; the second and stricter stage was introduced at different times in different Chinese 
cities after some years. Using economic experiments, we tested possible effects of the OCP on 
two broad groups of behavior, including individual decisions related to risk, ambiguity, and 
time preferences and interaction behavior focusing on cooperativeness, competitiveness, and 
bargaining decision.  
 
We find very little support for effects of the policy on preferences. We find some small 
differences when it comes to risk and ambiguity preferences, but basically there is no evidence 
of effects on time preferences and behavior in three experiments. Moreover, our robustness 
analyses suggest that part of the effect on uncertainty preferences is probably due to the 
university reform and not the OCP. Even when including cities with different timings of the 
introduction of the stricter policy, we are not able to identify effects of the OCP on preferences 
and behavior.  
 
Previous empirical studies on the effects of the OCP on preferences and behavior and the 
differences between only children and children with siblings do not show any consistent pattern. 
It is still interesting to contrast our results with those of Cameron et al. (2013), a study that also 
includes a set of economic experiments and uses a sample of subjects born before and after the 
policy was introduced in 1979. Since both their study and ours include risk and competition 
experiments, we can make a direct comparison for these experiments. They find that subjects 
born after 1979 were significantly more risk averse than those born before, whereas we find 
some evidence for the opposite. We find no significant differences in tournament entry 
decisions among the OCP stages, whereas they find a weakly significant difference in the 
likelihood to participate in a tournament between subjects born before and after the introduction 
of the OCP. Thus, as opposed to Cameron et al. (2013), we do not find any convincing evidence 
that the OCP has affected behavior or created “little emperors”. Alternatively, it might be the 
case that the “little emperor syndrome” does exist, but among most children being brought up 
in the urban areas of China. There is a large difference between rural and urban China, and 
previous research shows, for example, that making social identity in terms of the hukou identity 
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salient decreased the performance of rural migrant students relative to their urban counterparts 
(Afridi et al., 2015).  
 
Another possible explanation for the different conclusions between our study and that of 
Cameron et al. (2013) is that their subjects were living in Beijing, whereas ours were from three 
cities in three different provinces. Although Beijing is the capital and the largest city in China, 
with more than 21 million citizens, our cities are not small: Guilin and Wuxi both have over 4.7 
million residents, and Lanzhou has 3.6 million. Cameron et al. (2013) speculate that the 
differences they find apply to cities other than Beijing, but we find little support for this 
conjecture. It seems more likely that Beijing is an exception. It is one of the four municipalities 
that are directly under the central government and is more developed than other cities in China. 
Moreover, Beijing already had a lower fertility rate than the other provinces before the OCP 
(Coale and Li, 1987). This suggests that, if anything, the policy should have had an effect in the 
provinces we studied but not in Beijing. In summary, we do not find any significant impact of 
the OCP among adults on uncertainty and time preferences or on different kinds of behavior. 
These results hold for heterogeneity in the timing of the implementation of the OCP in different 
provinces, for heterogeneity among individuals, and for various robustness checks.  
 
Acknowledgments 
Financial support from the MISTRA COMMONS program and the Center for Collective 
Action Research is gratefully acknowledged. We have received valuable comments from 
seminar participants at the EfD Annual Workshop in Shanghai, Los Andes University, the 
University of Gothenburg, and University of Göttingen. 
 
References 
Afridi, F., S. Li, and Y. Ren (2015), Social identity and inequality: The impact of China’s hukou 
system, Journal of Public Economics 123, 17-29. 
Becker, G. (1991). A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press. 
Benjamini , Y. and Y. Hochberg (1995), Controlling for false discovery rate: A practical and 
powerful approach to multiple testing, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B, 
57 (1): 289-300.  
Benjamini, Y. and D. Yekutieli (2001), The control of the false discovery rate in multiple testing 
under dependency, The Annals of Statistics, 29 (4): 1165-1188. 
27 
 
Bulte, E., N. Heerink and X. Zhang (2011), China’s One-Child Policy and ‘the Mystery of 
MissingWomen’: Ethnic Minorities and Male-Biased Sex Ratios, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 73(1):21-39. 
Cameron, L., N. Erkal, L. Gangadharan and X. Meng (2013), Little Emperors: Behavioral 
Impacts of China’s One-Child Policy, Science 339, 953-957. 
Chaudhuri, A. (2011), Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a 
selective survey of the literature. Experimental Economics 14, 47-83. 
Che, Y., and L. Zhang (2018), Human Capital, Technology Adoption and Firm Performance: 
Impacts of China's Higher Education Expansion in the Late 1990s, Economic Journal, 
forthcoming.  
Chen J-Q., and L.T. Goldsmith (1991), Social and behavioral characteristics of Chinese only 
children: A review of research, Journal of Research in Childhood Education, 5(2), 127-
139. 
Coale, A., and C. Li (1987). Basic data on fertility in the provinces of China, 1940-1982, Papers 
of the East-West Population Institute No. 104. 
Croson, R. and U. Gneezy (2009). Gender differences in preferences, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 47: 448-474. 
Duflo, E., R. Glennerster, and M. Kremer (2008), Using randomization in development 
economics research: A toolkit. In: Handbook of Development Economics, Vol 4, eds. T. 
Schultz and J. Strauss: 3895-3962. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Dunn, O. (1961). Multiple comparison among means. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 56, 52-64. 
Eckel, C.C., Grossman, P.J., 2001. Chivalry and solidarity in ultimatum games. Economic 
Inquiry 39, 171–188. 
Falbo T. (1987), Only children in the United States and China. Applied Social Psychology 
Annual, 7:159-183. 
Falbo T. and D. L. Poston Jr., 1993. The academic, personality, and physical outcomes of only 
children in China. Child Development, 64, 18-35. 
Filippin, A., and P. Crosetto (2016), A reconsideration of gender differences in risk attitudes, 
Management Science 62, 3138-3160. 
Fischbacher, U. and S. Gächter (2010), Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free 
riding in public good experiments, American Economic Review 100, 541-556. 
Fischbacher, U., Gäcther, S., and E. Fehr (2001), Are people conditionally cooperative? 
Evidence from a public goods experiment, Economics Letters 71, 397-404. 
28 
 
Giuliano, P. and A. Spilimbergo (2014) Growing up in a recession, Review of Economic Studies 
81, 787-817. 
Grech, V., Savona-Ventura, C., and P. Vassalo-Agius (2002), Unexplained differences in sex 
ratios at birth in Europe and North America BMJ 324; 1010. 
Güth, W. and M. Kocher (2014), More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: 
Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature, Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 108, 396-409. 
Hannum, E. 2005. Market Transition, Educational Disparities, and Family Strategies in Rural 
China: New Evidence on Gender Stratification and Development. Demography, 42:275-
299. 
Hesketh T., and W.X. Zhu (1997), The one child family policy: the good, the bad, and the ugly, 
BMJ 1997;314:1167-72. 
Kahneman D. and A. Tversky (1979), Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica 47: 263-291.  
Kocher, M., Cherry, T., Kroll, S., Netzer, R., and M. Sutter (2008), Conditional cooperation on 
three continents, Economics Letters 101, 175-178.  
Laibson, D. (1997), Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
112, 443-478. 
Lampi E. and K. Nordblom (2010), Money and Success- Sibling and birth-order effects on 
positional concerns, Journal of Economic Psychology, 31 (1), 131-142. 
Li, H., J. Yi and J. Zhang (2011), Estimating the Effect of the One-Child Policy on the Sex 
Ratio Imbalance in China: Identification Based on the Difference-in-Differences, 
Demography, 48:1535–1557 
Li S. (2007), Imbalanced Sex Ratio at Birth and Comprehensive Intervention in China, Report, 
Institute for Population and Development Studies, Xi’an Jiaotong University 
Li, S., J. Walley and C. Xing (2014), China's higher education expansion and unemployment 
of college graduates, China Economic Review 30,567-582. 
Liu, Haoming (2014). The quality-quantity trade-off: Evidence from the relaxation of China’s 
one-child-policy. Journal of Population Economics 27 (2): 565-602. 
l'Haridon, O., F.M. Vieider, D. Aycinena, A. Bandur, A. Belianin, L. Cingl, A. Kothiyal, and 
P. Martinsson (2018). Off the Charts: Massive Unexplained Heterogeneity in a Global 
Study of Ambiguity Attitudes. Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming 
Martinsson, P., C. Villegas and C. Wollbrant, (2015) Cooperation and social classes: Evidence 
from Colombia, Social Choice and Welfare 45, 829-848. 
29 
 
Niederle, M. (2016). Gender. Handbook of Experimental Economics, second edition, Eds. J. 
Kagel and A.E. Roth, Princeton University Press, p. 481-553. 
Niederle, M., Vesterlund, L. (2007). Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men 
Compete Too Much? Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 1067-1101. 
OECD (2018) https://data.oecd.org/pop/fertility-rates.htm (accessed 2018-01-12) 
Peng X. (2011), China’s demographic history and future challenges, Science 333: 581-587. 
Rosenzweig M.R. and J. Zhang (2009). Do population control policies induce more human 
capital investment? Twins, birth weight and China’s one-child policy Review of Economic 
Studies 76 (3): 1149-74. 
Shen B-J. and J. Yuan (1999), Moral values of only and sibling children in mainland China, 
Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied 133 (1): 115-124. 
Sutter, M., Kocher, M., Glätzle-Rützler, D., and S. Trautman (2013) Impatience and 
uncertainty: Experimental decisions predict adolescents’ field behavior, American 
Economic Review 103, 510-531. 
Thaler, R.H., 1988. The ultimatum game. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, 195–206. 
Tseng S., T. Kuotai, J. Hsu, J. Chiu, L. Yu, and V. Kameoka (1988), Family planning and child 
mental health in China: the Nanjing survey, American Journal of Psychiatry 
145(11):1396-1403. 
UNFPA (2012), Sex imbalance at birth: current trends, consequences, and policy implications, 
Report from UNFPA:  
World Bank (2018) https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=CN 
(accessed 2018-01-12)  
Yang B., T. Ollendick, Q. Dong, Y. Xia, and L. Lin (1995), Only children and children with 
siblings in the People’s Republic of China: Levels of fear, anxiety, and depression, Child 
Development 66:1301-1311. 
Zhang, J. (2017), The Evolution of China’s one-child-policy and its effects on family outcomes, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(1):141-160. 
  
30 
 
Appendix A. Description of experiments 
 
Uncertainty preferences 
In the uncertainty experiments, subjects made repeated choices between a fixed amount of 
money and a lottery, building on the design of Sutter et al. (2013). The uncertainty experiments 
included a risk and an ambiguity experiment, both of which had three tasks, and each task 
included 80 choices. Only one task, and only one choice of that specific task, was randomly 
selected to be played to determine how much money a subject would earn. We used a choice 
list where the subject chose repeatedly between a safe amount and a lottery with a certain 
probability of winning a fixed amount (e.g., Sutter et al., 2013).  
 
In the risk experiment, subjects chose between a lottery with a chance to win 80 yuan and a safe 
amount of money increasing from 1 yuan to 80 yuan. The probability of winning was 50% in 
Task 1, 10% in Task 2, and 90% in Task 3. For each probability, subjects made repeated 
decisions between the lottery and the safe amount, with the safe amount increased by 1 yuan in 
each step. To make it a bit easier, subjects were instructed to draw a line between the rows 
where they started to prefer the safe amount.  
 
The payout from the risk experiment was determined as follows (if the risk experiment had 
been randomly chosen to be payout relevant): If the subject chose the safe amount of money, 
the corresponding amount was paid. If the subject chose the lottery, the experimenter filled a 
red bag with 10 balls numbered from 1 to 10. Before drawing a ball, the subject told the 
experimenter five numbers between 1 and 10 in the case of a 50% probability of winning (one 
number if 10% and nine numbers if 90%), and then the subject drew a ball from the red bag. If 
the subject drew a ball with any of the chosen numbers, she received 80 yuan; otherwise, she 
did not receive anything.  
  
The ambiguity experiment was similar to the risk experiment in that it also included three tasks 
with 80 choices in each task, but there was one important difference: The composition of 10 
balls in a black bag was unknown. Subjects knew that a number between 1 and 10 was written 
on each ball, but not how many of each number were in the bag. The subjects needed to decide 
whether to draw a ball from the black bag with the chance of winning 80 yuan or to receive a 
safe amount of money increasing from 1 yuan to 80 yuan. Again, to make it easier, subjects 
were instructed to draw a line between the rows where they started to prefer the safe amount. 
31 
 
As in the risk experiment, the three tasks had different winning probabilities of 10%, 50%, and 
90%.  
 
Time preferences 
In the time preference experiments, Subjects were asked to make repeated choices between a 
sooner payment that was fixed and a later payment that would increase. The experiment 
included four tasks, and each task had 20 choices. Only one task, and only one choice of that 
specific task, was randomly selected to be played to determine how much money subjects would 
earn. The four tasks meant making decisions between (i) today and one week, (ii) one week and 
two weeks, (iii) today and two weeks, and (iv) two weeks and four weeks. In all the tasks, the 
sooner payment was 40 yuan, and the later payment increased from 41 yuan to 60 yuan. As in 
the risk and ambiguity experiments, subjects were instructed to draw a line between the rows 
where they started to prefer a later payment. The payment date differed depending on the 
decisive choice: If the subjects chose payment today, they were paid via bank transfer within 
two hours after the experiment. If they chose a later payment, subjects were also paid via bank 
transfer, but on the specific date they had chosen (one week, two weeks, or four weeks). 
Whether they had chosen a sooner or later payment, the subjects each received a slip of paper 
with the amount earned and the payment date, which was signed by the project leader.  
 
Competition experiment  
The competition experiment followed the design of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), with three 
tasks, only one of which would be randomly selected as payoff relevant. Each subject was 
randomly matched with three other participants to form a group, but they did not know who the 
other members were. The group composition was the same during the whole competition 
experiment, and in each group, two were men and two were women. Subjects faced the task of 
calculating the sum of five randomly chosen two-digit numbers. Subjects were not allowed to 
use a calculator, but they could write the numbers down and make use of pens and scratch paper 
that we provided. So that subjects could familiarize themselves with the task, they first had a 
one-minute trial round. After that, the formal tasks started.  
 
For Task 1, which had a piece rate payment, subjects were asked to calculate the sum of five 
randomly chosen two-digit numbers and write their answers on an answer sheet. The time for 
this task was three minutes. The payment was 3 yuan per problem solved if the task was 
randomly selected for payment. Task 2 was a tournament in which subjects had three minutes 
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to solve the same type of math problems. Now the payment depended on the subject’s 
performance relative to that of other group members. The group member who solved the largest 
number of problems correctly received 12 yuan per problem solved, while the other participants 
received no payment. In case of a tie, the ranking between the members with equal performance 
was determined randomly. For Task 3, subjects first had to choose the payment schedule, piece 
rate or tournament, and then again solve the same type of math problems. If a subject chose the 
piece rate, payment was again 3 yuan per problem solved. If a subject chose tournament, her 
performance was evaluated relative to the performance of the other three group members in 
Task 2. If the subject solved more problems correctly than the other three group members, 
payment was 12 yuan per problem solved. Finally, subjects guessed their rank relative to other 
group members in Tasks 1 and 2. For each correct guess, they earned 3 yuan. 
 
We needed to ensure that there were two men and two women in each group. Therefore, male 
and female subjects each drew a decision sheet from two separate boxes where each sheet had 
a letter from A to Z.15 Two men and two women who had the same letter were placed in the 
same group. At the end of the experiment, each subject drew from a lottery with balls numbered 
1 to 3 to decide which task would be used as the decisive task for payment.  
 
Public good experiment 
In the public good experiment, we use a design similar to that of Fischbacher et al. (2001), in 
which subjects made two contribution tasks. Each subject was endowed with 20 tokens, each 
token equivalent to 2 yuan. Subjects were in groups consisting of four members. They were 
asked to allocate the 20 tokens between a private account and a public account. The money in 
the private account was the subject’s own money. The money in the public account would be 
shared by all the group members. For each group member, the income from the public account 
was equal to the total amount of money put into the public account by all group members 
multiplied by 0.4. By choosing a marginal per capita return from the public good below one, 
we created the incentive to free ride, but since the return from the public good would exceed 
one if all four group members contributed, it was socially optimal for all subjects to contribute. 
Each subject’s total income was equal to the income from his private account plus his share of 
income from the public account. Before the decisions were made, we included three control 
questions to ensure that subjects understood how to calculate the total income. Only when 
                                                        
15 After the 26 letters, we combined two different letters (AA, AB, AC, etc.). 
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subjects had answered all the control questions correctly were they allowed to continue with 
the formal decisions.  
 
In Task 1, subjects decided how many of their tokens they wanted to put into the public account 
and into the private account. In Task 2, subjects decided how much to contribute to the public 
account conditional on a specific average contribution of the other group members. There were 
21 possible average contributions that ranged from 0 to 20 tokens. Since subjects did not know 
beforehand the average contribution of the three other group members, they had to state their 
contribution for each of these potential average contributions by the other three group members. 
To make all choice incentives compatible, three group members were randomly selected for 
whom Task 1 was payout relevant. For the fourth subject, the average contributions of the other 
three members were used in the contribution table in Task 2 to determine the allocation to public 
good. Subjects did not know with whom they were matched or which of the tasks would be 
payout relevant at the time of making their allocation decisions. In practice, we determined the 
payoff from the game by having each subject draw a ticket from a box. Each ticket had a letter 
from A to Z,16along with the number 1 or 2. The letter determined which group the subject 
would belong to, and the number indicated which decision would be used for payment. Then 
groups were formed as described above and payment was calculated accordingly. 
 
Ultimatum bargaining experiment 
Subjects were randomly matched in pairs for the ultimatum bargaining experiment, and again 
they did not have any information about each other. This experiment included two roles, player 
1 and player 2. Subjects did not know their role beforehand, so they had to make decisions as 
both player 1 and player 2. After the experiment, the role of each subject was determined by 
rolling a two-sided die. The experiment worked as follows: Player 1 decided how to allocate an 
endowment of 40 yuan between the two subjects, and player 2 decided whether to accept or 
refuse the allocation. If player 2 accepted player 1’s allocation, then player 1 and player 2 split 
the money according to player 1’s allocation. If player 2 refused player 1’s allocation, then 
neither player received anything. The experiment consisted of four tasks: (i) In the role of player 
1, the subject decided how to allocate the 40 yuan. (ii) In the role of player 2, the subject decided 
what would be the minimum amount she would accept. (iii) The subject guessed the average 
amount that all the other subjects allocated to player 2. (iv) The subject guessed the average 
                                                        
16 Again, after the 26 letters, we combined two different letters (AA, AB, AC, etc.). 
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minimum amount of all other subjects when responding as player 2. The payoff from the 
experiment was determined in a stepwise manner. First, each subject drew a ticket, which was 
labeled either 1 or 2, to determine whether the subject would be paid as player 1 or player 2. 
Then the subjects were matched in pairs. For each pair, the experimenter compared the 
decisions of player 1 and player 2. If player 1’s allocation was accepted by player 2, then both 
of them got the money according to player 1’s decision. Otherwise, both of them did not get 
anything.  
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Appendix B. Heterogeneous effects of the policy 
 
Table B1. Regression model of risk and ambiguity preferences by gender 
 Risk Ambiguity 
 Men Women Men Women 
Probability 10% 2.33*** 
(0.17) 
2.45*** 
(0.15) 
1.86*** 
(0.16) 
1.85*** 
(0.15) 
Probability 50% 0.85*** 
(0.08) 
0.91*** 
(0.06) 
0.60*** 
(0.09) 
0.63*** 
(0.07) 
Probability 90% 0.73*** 
(0.08) 
0.80*** 
(0.06) 
0.61*** 
(0.09) 
0.60*** 
(0.06) 
Probability 10% × First stage 
OCP 
0.40 
(0.34) 
0.36 
(0.26) 
0.25 
(0.31) 
0.44* 
(0.25) 
Probability 50% × First stage 
OCP 
0.07 
(0.09) 
0.14 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.10) 
0.13 
(0.10) 
Probability 90% × First stage 
OCP 
0.0001 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
Probability 10% × Second stage 
OCP 
0.20 
(0.28) 
0.06 
(0.27) 
0.58** 
(0.29) 
0.37 
(0.25) 
Probability 50% × Second stage 
OCP 
0.11 
(0.18) 
0.14 
(0.19) 
0.13 
(0.21) 
0.21 
(0.19) 
Probability 90% × Second stage 
OCP 
0.02 
(0.18) 
0.12 
(0.19) 
0.04 
 (0.20) 
0.19 
(0.19) 
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,188 1,158 1,188 1,158 
Number of individuals  396 386 396 386 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, 
** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
 
Table B2. Regression model of time preference by gender  
 Men Women 
log(β)  0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Log(δ) -0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
log(β) × First stage OCP -0.012* 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
log(δ) × First stage OCP -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
log(β) × Second stage OCP -0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
log(δ) × Second stage OCP 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
Age Yes Yes 
Location Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,584 1,544 
Number of individuals  396 386 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
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Table B3. Regression models of behavioral experiments by gender  
 PG Comp perform Comp entry Ultimatum Offer Ultimatum 
accept 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
First stage. 
OCP  
-
0.0001 
(0.97) 
-0.58 
(0.81) 
-0.30 
(0.43) 
0.38 
(0.45) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.13 
(0.09) 
0.54 
(0.44) 
-0.31 
(0.38) 
1.97* 
(1.11) 
-1.16 
(1.12) 
Second 
stage. OCP  
-1.23 
(1.35) 
-0.68 
(1.25) 
-0.08 
(0.60) 
0.90 
(0.70) 
-0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.005 
(0.13) 
0.83 
(0.62) 
-0.22 
(0.59) 
2.04 
(1.54) 
-0.19 
(1.73) 
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
individuals  
396 386 396 386 396 386 396 386 396 386 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% 
level. 
 
Table B4. Regression model of risk and ambiguity preferences by location 
 Risk  Ambiguity  
 Guilin Wuxi Lanzhou Guilin Wuxi Lanzhou 
Probability 10% 2.20*** 
(0.16) 
2.85*** 
(0.22) 
2.36*** 
(0.20) 
1.59*** 
(0.16) 
2.55*** 
(0.22) 
1.83*** 
(0.20) 
Probability 50% 0.81*** 
(0.07) 
1.04*** 
(0.09) 
0.96*** 
(0.09) 
0.55*** 
(0.08) 
0.86*** 
(0.10) 
0.72*** 
(0.11) 
Probability 90% 0.73*** 
(0.07) 
0.88*** 
(0.11) 
0.83*** 
(0.09) 
0.58*** 
(0.08) 
0.77*** 
(0.09) 
0.72*** 
(0.10) 
Probability 10% × First stage OCP 0.17 
(0.37) 
0.32 
(0.33) 
0.68* 
(0.40) 
0.19 
(0.31) 
0.12 
(0.34) 
0.70* 
(0.38) 
Probability 50% × First stage OCP -0.03 
(0.09) 
0.23 
(0.15) 
0.24* 
(0.3) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
0.20 
(0.16) 
0.23 
(0.14) 
Probability 90% × First stage OCP -0.07 
(0.07) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
0.16 
(0.15) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
Probability 10% × Second stage OCP 0.04 
(0.29) 
0.11 
(0.40) 
0.43 
(0.37) 
0.49 
(0.30) 
0.36 
(0.31) 
0.72** 
 (0.36) 
Probability 50% × Second stage OCP -0.08 
(0.18) 
0.25 
(0.29) 
0.39 
(0.25) 
-0.006 
(0.20) 
0.27 
(0.31) 
0.37 
(0.28) 
Probability 90% × Second stage OCP -0.16 
(0.18) 
0.25 
(0.29) 
0.32 
(0.24) 
-0.09 
(0.19) 
0.30 
(0.30) 
0.29 
(0.27) 
Age  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,005 600 741 1,005 600 741 
Number of individuals 335 200 247 335 200 247 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.  
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Table B5. Regression models of time preference by location  
                                                           City 
 Guilin Wuxi Lanzhou 
log(𝛽) 0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
log(𝛿) -0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.009) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
log(𝛽) × First stage OCP -0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
log(𝛿) × First stage OCP -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
log(𝛽) × Second stage 
OCP 
0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
-0.020* 
(0.012) 
log(𝛿) × Second stage 
OCP 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Number of observations 1,340 
 
800 
 
988 
 
Number of individuals 335 200 247 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
 
Table B6. Regression models of behavioral experiments by location 
 PG Competition Ultimatum 
 Contribution 
 
Performance 
increase 
Choose 
tournament 
Offer Min. acceptable 
offer 
 Guilin (Number of individuals = 335) 
First stage OCP  -0.658 
(0.960) 
0.432 
(0.454) 
0.176* 
(0.106) 
0.033 
(0.402) 
-0.952 
(1.195) 
Second stage OCP  -0.640 
(1.268) 
0.508 
(0.599) 
0.090 
(0.125) 
0.085 
(0.531) 
-0.903 
(1.578) 
 Wuxi (Number of individuals = 200) 
First stage OCP  -0.063 
(.1.336) 
-0,707 
(0.692) 
-0.02 
(0.115) 
1.167** 
(0.573) 
1.353 
(1.605) 
Second stage OCP  -1.826 
(2.187) 
-0.690 
(1.134) 
0.011 
(0.197) 
2.493*** 
(0.938) 
3.821 
(2.628) 
 Lanzhou (Number of individuals = 247) 
First stage OCP  -1.240 
(1.195) 
-0.048 
(0.585) 
0.024 
(0.127) 
-0.357 
(0.628) 
2.276 
(1.488) 
Second stage OCP  -2.929* 
(1.777) 
0.300 
(0.871) 
-0.174 
(0.185) 
-0.722 
(0.934) 
3.023 
(2.213) 
Note: Age fixed effects in all models, except Lanzhou. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
 
. 
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Table B7. Regression model of risk and ambiguity preferences with additional covariates 
 Risk Ambiguity 
Probability 10% 2.55*** 
(0.13) 
2.13*** 
(0.14) 
Probability 50% 1.04*** 
(0.09) 
0.88*** 
(0.10) 
Probability 90% 0.92*** 
(0.09) 
0.87*** 
(0.10) 
Probability 10% × First stage OCP 0.40* 
(0.21) 
0.38** 
(0.20) 
Probability 50% × First stage OCP 0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.14 
(0.07) 
Probability 90% × First stage OCP 0.06 
(0.06) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
Probability 10% × Second stage OCP 0.16 
(0.19) 
0.53*** 
(0.19) 
Probability 50% × Second stage OCP 0.16 
(0.13) 
0.20 
(0.14) 
Probability 90% × Second stage OCP 0.10 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.14) 
Female -0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.13** 
(0.05) 
Have children -0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
Married -0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.10 
(0.08) 
Household income 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
University -0.16*** 
(0.05) 
-0.16*** 
(0.05) 
Parent university -0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
Age Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2346 2346 
Number of individuals 782 782 
H0: No difference between OCP stages P-values 
Probability 10%   
Before vs First  0.05 0.05 
Before vs Second  0.40 0.01 
First vs Second 0.26 0.48 
Probability 50%   
Before vs First  0.06 0.04 
Before vs Second  0.23 0.15 
First vs Second 0.71 0.48 
Probability 90%   
Before vs First  0.32 0.22 
Before vs Second  0.45 0.28 
First vs Second 0.63 0.39 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
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Table B8. Regression model of time preference with additional covariates 
 Coefficient  
log(𝛽) 0.001 
(0.005) 
 
log(𝛿) -0.009*** 
(0.0007) 
 
log(𝛽) × First stage OCP -0.005 
(0.006) 
 
log(𝛿) × First stage OCP -0.0001 
(0.0006) 
 
log(𝛽) × Second stage OCP -0.006 
(0.007) 
 
log(𝛿) × Second stage OCP -0.001 
(0.001) 
 
log(𝛽) × Female 0.0007 
(0.003) 
 
log(𝛿) × Female -0.0002 
(0.0003) 
 
log(𝛽) × Have children -0.0004 
(0.003) 
 
log(𝛿) × Have children 0.0005 
(0.0005) 
 
log(𝛽) × Married 0.0006 
(0.004) 
 
log(𝛿) × Married -0.0005 
(0.0005) 
 
log(𝛽) × Household income 0.00008 
(0.0001) 
 
log(𝛿) × Household income -0.00002 
(0.00001) 
 
log(𝛽) × University -0.0029 
(0.0029) 
 
log(𝛿) × University 0.001** 
(0.0004) 
 
log(𝛽) × Parent university 0.003 
(0.003) 
 
log(𝛿) × Parent university -0.0004 
(0.0004) 
 
Age Yes  
Location Yes  
Number of observations 3128  
Number of individuals 782  
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level. 
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Table B9. Regression models of behavioral experiments with additional covariates 
 PG Competition Ultimatum 
 Contribution Performance 
increase 
Choose 
tournament 
Offer Min. acceptable 
offer 
First stage OCP  -0.198 
(0.636) 
-0.052 
(0.312) 
0.065 
(0.068) 
0.073 
(0.293) 
0.408 
(0.789) 
Second stage OCP  -0.795 
(0.940) 
0.196 
(0.460) 
-0.041 
(0.096) 
0.224 
(0.432) 
1.025 
(1.165) 
Female -0.840** 
(0.331) 
0.316* 
(0.162) 
-0.228*** 
(0.033) 
0.026 
(0.152) 
-0.180 
(0.410) 
Have children -0.4791 
(0.482) 
0.444* 
(0.236) 
0.035 
(0.048) 
0.282 
(0.222) 
-0.201 
(0.598) 
Married 0.016 
(0.510) 
-0.426 
(0.250) 
0.066 
(0.049) 
0.174 
(0.235) 
0.645 
(0.633) 
Household income -0.005 
(0.017) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.021) 
University -0.706** 
(0.347) 
0.038 
(0.170) 
0.028 
(0.036) 
-0.183 
(0.160) 
-0.596 
(0.430) 
Parent university -0.140 
(0.394) 
-0.223 
(0.193) 
0.054 
(0.041) 
-0.160 
(0.181) 
-0.320 
(0.488) 
Age  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
individuals 
782 782 782 782 782 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% 
level. 
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Appendix C. Robustness checks with new cutoff dates (minus one year) 
Table C1. Regression models, the OCP and the likelihood of being an only child and the 
number of siblings, marginal effects for probit model  
 Only child No. of siblings 
First stage OCP 0.189*** 
(0.033) 
-0.450*** 
(0.068) 
Second stage OCP 0.289*** 
(0.087) 
-0.458*** 
(0.103) 
Time Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects 
Gender 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Number of individuals  782 782 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
 
Table C2. Ratio between certainty equivalent and expected value in risk and ambiguity 
experiments with new cutoff dates (minus one year) 
 Risk experiment Ambiguity experiment 
 10% 50%  90% 10% 50% 90% 
Before OCP  2.41 
(1.59) 
0.92 
(0.31) 
0.79 
(0.14) 
1.95 
(1.58) 
0.66 
(0.34) 
0.63 
(0.22) 
First stage OCP  2.64 
(1.94) 
0.94 
(0.31) 
0.79 
(0.14) 
2.08 
(1.80) 
0.72 
(0.37) 
0.68 
(0.21) 
Second stage 
OCP  
2.51 
(1.86) 
0.97 
(0.34) 
0.80 
(0.14) 
2.26 
(1.93) 
0.72 
(0.36) 
0.66 
(0.21) 
Number of 
individuals 
782 782 782 782 782 782 
H0: No difference between OCP stages, P-values 
Before vs First  0.627 0.758 0.979 0.789 0.130 0.030 
Before vs 
Second  
0.943 0.130 0.467 0.145 0.051 0.091 
First vs Second 0.608 0.318 0.501 0.363 0.938 0.297 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table C3. Regression model of time preference 
 Coefficient  
log(𝛽) 0.002 
(0.004) 
 
log(𝛿) -0.009*** 
(0.0005) 
 
log(𝛽) × First stage OCP -0.004 
(0.004) 
 
log(𝛿) × First stage OCP 0.0002 
(0.001) 
 
log(𝛽) × Second stage OCP -0.006 
(0.007) 
 
log(𝛿) × Second stage OCP 0.002 
(0.001) 
 
Age Yes  
Location Yes  
Number of observations 3128  
Number of individuals 782  
 𝛽 a 𝛿  a 
Before OCP  0.998 
(0.010) 
0.976*** 
(0.001) 
First stage OCP  0.988* 
(0.007) 
0.976*** 
(0.001) 
Second stage OCP 0.984** 
(0.006) 
0.978*** 
(0.001) 
H0: No difference between OCP stages P-values 
Before vs First  0.307 0.664 
Before vs Second  0.402 0.091 
First vs Second 0.770 0.009 
Note: Clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 
5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
a Test if different from one. 
 
 
 
Table C4. Average values of main variables in the three behavioral experiments with new 
cutoff dates (minus one year) 
 PG Competition Ultimatum 
 Contribution Performance 
increase 
Choose 
tournament 
Offer Min. acceptable 
offer 
Before OCP  8.04 
(4.17) 
0.70 
(2.33) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
19.94 
(1.76) 
15.04 
(5.68) 
First stage OCP 8.07 
(4.54) 
0.49 
(2.51) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
19.64 
(2.24) 
14.53 
(5.85) 
Second stage OCP 8.15 
(4.79) 
0.64 
(2.13) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
19.45 
(2.20) 
15.43 
(5.64) 
Number of individuals 782 782 782 782 782 
 P-value test hypothesis 
Before vs First  0.938 0.412 0.139 0.241 0.616 
Before vs Second  0.819 0.800 0.060 0.012 0.252 
First vs Second 0.925 0.485 1.000 0.418 0.104 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Appendix D. Robustness checks with only firstborns 
 
Table D1. Ratio between certainty equivalence and expected value in risk and ambiguity 
experiments with only firstborns 
 Risk experiment Ambiguity experiment 
 10% 50%  90% 10% 50% 90% 
Whole sample 2.46 
(1.79) 
0.96 
(0.33) 
0.80 
(0.14) 
2.13 
(1.82) 
0.70 
(0.36) 
0.66 
(0.21) 
Before OCP 2.22 
(1.59) 
0.90 
(0.29) 
0.78 
(0.15) 
1.66 
(1.26) 
0.62 
(0.33) 
0.63 
(0.22) 
First stage OCP  2.75 
(2.00) 
0.99 
(0.34) 
0.81 
(0.13) 
2.29 
(1.92) 
0.74 
(0.34) 
0.67 
(0.20) 
Second stage OCP 2.49 
(1.80) 
0.97 
(0.34) 
0.80 
(0.14) 
2.29 
(1.96) 
0.73 
(0.37) 
0.66 
(0.21) 
No. of individuals 637 637 637 637 637 637 
H0: No difference between OCP stages (P-values) 
Before vs First  0.190 0.009 0.068 0.041 0.014 0.311 
Before vs Second  0.594 0.005 0.150 0.019 0.017 0.381 
First vs Second 0.153 0.620 0.234 0.826 0.375 0.495 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard deviations in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
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Table D2. Regression model of time preferences with only firstborns 
 Coefficient  
log(𝛽) 0.003 
(0.005) 
 
log(𝛿) -0.009*** 
(0.001) 
 
log(𝛽) × First stage OCP -0.003 
(0.005) 
 
log(𝛿) × First stage OCP 0.0005 
(0.001) 
 
log(𝛽) × Second stage OCP -0.005 
(0.008) 
 
log(𝛿) × Second stage OCP 0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Age Yes  
Location fixed effects Yes  
Number of observations 2548  
Number of individuals 637  
 𝛽 a 𝛿  a 
Before OCP  0.996 
(0.011) 
 
0.976*** 
(0.002) 
First stage OCP  0.989 
(0.008) 
 
0.977*** 
(0.001) 
 
Second stage OCP 0.984* 
(0.009) 
 
0.980*** 
(0.001) 
 
H0: No difference between OCP stages P-values 
Before vs First  0.541 0.530 
Before vs Second  0.495 0.208 
First vs Second 0.699 0.197 
Note: Clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 
5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
a Test if different from one. 
 
 
Table D3. Average values of main variables in the three behavioral experiments with only 
firstborns. 
 PG Competition Ultimatum 
 Contribution Performance 
increase 
Choose 
tournament 
Offer Min. acceptable 
offer 
Before OCP 7.72 
(4.23) 
0.67 
(2.53) 
0.27 
(0.45) 
19.87 
(1.61) 
14.95 
(5.70) 
First stage OCP 8.08 
(4.31) 
0.47 
(2.34) 
0.34 
(0.48) 
19.65 
(2.11) 
15.18 
(5.83) 
Second stage OCP 8.02 
(4.80) 
0.63 
(2.13) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
19.43 
(2.18) 
15.48 
(5.55) 
Number of individuals 637 637 637 637 637 
 P-value test hypothesis 
Before vs First  0.631 0.465 0.290 0.952 0.257 
Before vs Second  0.583 0.938 0.430 0.041 0.068 
First vs Second 0.211 0.699 0.295 0.120 0.907 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Appendix E. Robustness checks for university reform 
 
Table E1. Regression model of risk and ambiguity preferences 
 Risk Ambiguity 
Probability 10% 2.39*** 
(0.11) 
1.83*** 
(0.11) 
Probability 50% 0.88*** 
(0.05) 
0.59*** 
(0.06) 
Probability 90% 0.76*** 
(0.05) 
0.58*** 
(0.06) 
Probability 10% × First stage OCP 0.37* 
(0.21) 
0.40* 
(0.20) 
Probability 50% × First stage OCP 0.09 
(0.08) 
0.16 
(0.08) 
Probability 90% × First stage OCP 0.03 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
Probability 10% × Second stage OCP 0.12 
(0.22) 
0.60* 
(0.22) 
Probability 50% × Second stage OCP 0.11 
(0.17) 
0.28 
(0.17) 
Probability 90% × Second stage OCP 0.05 
(0.17) 
0.23 
(0.17) 
University reform 0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
Age Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2346 2346 
Number of individuals  782 782 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
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Table E2. Regression model of time preferences 
 Coefficient  
log(𝛽) -0.002 
(0.002) 
 
log(𝛿) -0.010*** 
(0.000) 
 
log(𝛽) × First stage OCP -0.003 
(0.005) 
 
log(𝛿) × First stage OCP 0.001 
(0.001) 
 
log(𝛽) × Second stage OCP -0.000 
(0.007) 
 
log(𝛿) × Second stage OCP -0.001 
(0.001) 
 
log(𝛽)  × University reform -0.004 
(0.006) 
 
log(𝛿) × University reform 0.001* 
(0.001) 
 
Age Yes  
Location fixed effects Yes  
Number of observations 3128  
Number of individuals 782  
Note: Clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 
5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
Table E3. Regression models of behavioral experiments 
 PG Competition Ultimatum 
 Contribution Performance 
increase 
Choose 
tournament 
Offer Min. acceptable 
offer 
First stage OCP  -0.596 
(0.692) 
0.099 
(0.339) 
0.152 
(0.197) 
0.232 
(0.317) 
-0.174 
(0.852) 
Second stage OCP  -0.151 
(1.113) 
0.478 
(0.553) 
-0.082 
(0.320) 
0.793 
(0.517) 
-0.247 
(1.390) 
University reform  0.749 
(0.850) 
-0.284 
(0.416) 
0.113 
(0.240) 
-0.649* 
(0.390) 
1.688 
(1.047) 
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
individuals 
782 782 782 782 782 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% 
level. 
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Table E4. Regression model of risk and ambiguity preferences to test effects of university 
reform 
 Risk Ambiguity 
 No univ. Univ. No univ. Univ. 
Probability 10% 2.55*** 
(0.15) 
2.03*** 
(0.18) 
2.00*** 
(0.14) 
1.52*** 
(0.18) 
Probability 50% 0.85*** 
(0.07) 
0.85*** 
(0.08) 
0.59*** 
(0.07) 
0.55*** 
(0.10) 
Probability 90% 0.70*** 
(0.07) 
0.78*** 
(0.08) 
0.55*** 
(0.07) 
0.59*** 
(0.10) 
Probability 10% × First stage OCP 0.29 
(0.32) 
0.60** 
(0.27) 
0.35 
(0.31) 
0.49* 
(0.25) 
Probability 50% × First stage OCP 0.10 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
0.14 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.10) 
Probability 90% × First stage OCP 0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.10) 
-0.00 
(0.09) 
Probability 10% × Second stage OCP 0.14 
(0.28) 
0.26 
(0.27) 
0.38 
(0.28) 
0.66** 
(0.28) 
Probability 50% × Second stage OCP 0.19 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
0.25 
(0.21) 
0.06 
(0.20) 
Probability 90% × Second stage OCP 0.12 
(0.19) 
-0.06 
(0.17) 
0.18 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(0.20) 
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1140 1206 1140 1206 
Number of individuals 380 402 380 402 
H0: No effect of university reform, Chow test p-value 0.031 0.009 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.  
 
 
Table E5. Regression model of time preferences to test effects of university reform  
 No univ. Univ. 
log(𝛽) -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
log(𝛿) -0.010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010*** 
(0.000) 
log(𝛽) × First stage OCP -0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
log(𝛿) × First stage OCP -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
log(𝛽) × Second stage OCP -0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
log(𝛿) × Second stage OCP -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Age Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1520 1608 
Number of individuals 380 402 
H0: No effect of university reform Chow-test p-value                                               0.002 
Note: Clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 
5% level, * significant at 10% level.  
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Table E6. Regression models of behavioral experiments to test effects of university reform 
             PG Competition Ultimatum 
 Contribution Performance 
increase 
Choose tournament Offer Min. acceptable offer 
 No univ. Univ. No univ. Univ. No univ. Univ. No univ. Univ. No univ. Univ. 
First stage OCP  -1.317 
(0.995) 
0.480 
(1.000) 
-0.590 
(0.471) 
0.769 
(0.490) 
-0.174 
(0.291) 
0.396 
(0.273) 
0.446 
(0.369) 
0.215 
(0.516) 
-0.812 
(1.192) 
0.613 
(1.223) 
Second stage OCP  -0.190 
(1.652) 
-2.025 
(1.550) 
-0.133 
(0.841) 
1.152 
(0.760) 
-0.649 
(0.493) 
0.336 
(0.427) 
0.818 
(0.637) 
0.770 
(0.799) 
-2.227 
(2.060) 
1.287 
(1.896) 
University reform  0.448 
(1.243) 
0.484 
(1.176) 
0.069 
(0.613) 
-0.728 
(0.576) 
0.483 
(0.373) 
-0.140 
(0.320) 
-0.500 
(0.480) 
-0.743 
(0.607) 
1.867 
(1.550) 
1.530 
(1.439) 
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
H0: No effect of university 
reform, Chow test p-value 
0.064 0.346 0.410 0.643 0.207 
Number of individuals 380 402 380 402 380 402 380 402 380 402 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.  
49 
 
 
Table E7. Regression model of risk and ambiguity preferences to test effects of university 
reform using predicted university education for those born 1981 and later 
 Risk Ambiguity 
 No univ. Univ. No univ. Univ. 
Probability 10% 2.59*** 
(0.14) 
2.02*** 
(0.18) 
2.05*** 
(0.14) 
1.50*** 
(0.18) 
Probability 50% 0.89*** 
(0.06) 
0.83*** 
(0.09) 
0.64*** 
(0.07) 
0.53*** 
(0.10) 
Probability 90% 0.74*** 
(0.06) 
0.76*** 
(0.09) 
0.60*** 
(0.07) 
0.57*** 
(0.10) 
Probability 10% × First stage OCP -0.02 
(0.29) 
0.89*** 
(0.30) 
-0.01 
(0.26) 
0.82*** 
(0.29) 
Probability 50% × First stage OCP -0.01 
(0.09) 
0.19** 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
0.18* 
(0.10) 
Probability 90% × First stage OCP -0.02 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
Probability 10% × Second stage OCP -0.22 
(0.27) 
0.57** 
(0.28) 
0.16 
(0.28) 
0.88*** 
(0.28) 
Probability 50% × Second stage OCP -0.01 
(0.18) 
0.20 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
0.25 
(0.21) 
Probability 90% × Second stage OCP -0.04 
(0.18) 
0.09 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
0.13 
(0.21) 
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1344 1002 1344 1002 
Number of individuals 448 334 448 334 
H0: No effect of university reform, Chow test p-value 0.168 0.193 
Note: OLS regression and clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
Table E8. Regression model of time preferences to test effects of university reform using 
predicted university education for those born 1981 and later 
                      No univ.                 Univ. 
log(𝛽) -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
log(𝛿) -0.010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010*** 
(0.000) 
log(𝛽) × First stage OCP -0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
log(𝛿) × First stage OCP -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
log(𝛽) × Second stage OCP -0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
log(𝛿) × Second stage OCP -0.001* 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Age Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1792 1336 
Number of individuals 448 334 
H0: No effect of university reform, Chow test p-
value 
                                              0.616 
Note: Clustered at individual level. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 
5% level, * significant at 10% level.  
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Table E9. Regression models of behavioral experiments to test effects of university reform using predicted university  
education for those born 1981 and later 
             PG Competition Ultimatum 
 Contribution Performance 
increase 
Choose tournament Offer Min. acceptable offer 
 No univ. Univ. No univ. Univ. No univ. Univ. No univ. Univ. No univ. Univ. 
First stage OCP  -1.274 
(0.947) 
0.190 
(1.017) 
-0.494 
(0.473) 
0.772 
(0.483) 
-0.164 
(0.287) 
0.381 
(0.278) 
0.430 
(0.396) 
0.257 
(0.514) 
-0.425 
(1.119) 
0.297 
(1.219) 
Second stage OCP  -0.751 
(1.528) 
-2.639 
(1.690) 
-0.096 
(0.763) 
1.272 
(0.803) 
-0.503 
(0.459) 
0.142 
(0.461) 
1.598 
(0.639) 
0.000 
(0.855) 
-0.200 
(1.923) 
-0.400 
(2.027) 
University reform  0.746 
(1.150) 
0.538 
(1.272) 
0.321 
(0.574) 
-1.075 
(0.604) 
0.263 
(0.348) 
0.149 
(0.344) 
-1.337 
(0.481) 
0.100 
(0.643) 
1.123 
(1.449) 
1.923 
(1.523) 
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
H0: No effect of 
university reform, 
Chow test p-value 
0.160 0.054 0.029 0.298 0.302 
Number of 
individuals 
448 334 448 334 448 334 448 334 448 334 
Note: University education for subjects born in 1981 and later is based on prediction from a model explaining university education among those born before 1981. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
